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NARRAGANSETT'S SMOKE SHOP RAID: 
NARRAGANSETT INDIAN TRIBE OF RHODE ISLAND 
V. THE STATE OF RHODE ISLAND 
by 
Charles Hickox* 
Andrew Laviano** 
Katherine Elisabeth Kosterlitz*** 
INTRODUCTION 
On July 14, 2003, Rhode Island State Police, acting on 
orders from the Governor and pursuant to a search warrant, 
entered Narragansett Indian settlement land in Charlestown, 
Rhode Island. 1 The state had probable cause to believe that the 
tribe was selling cigarettes in violation of R.I.G.L., Title 44, 
Section 20-122 that imposes a tax in the form of a stamp to be 
affixed to all cigarettes sold in the State. Probable cause was 
based on direct observation, general knowledge and public 
advertising that the Indians had been selling untaxed cigarettes 
for the previous two days.3 A melee ensued when the Indians 
resisted the execution of the warrants. 4 The video of the scuffle 
and consequent arrests made national news.5 Eight Indians, 
including Chief Sachem Matthew Thomas, were arrested and 
the tribe's entire inventory of contraband6 cigarettes was 
confiscated. The seized items consisted of approximately 1,200 
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cartons of cigarettes. 7 This incident was the latest of many 
confrontations between the tribe and government officials that 
go back to the early encounters with the colonists. 
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
The first recorded contact between Europeans and the 
Narragansett Indians occurred in June 1524 when Giovanni da 
Verrazzano sailed into Narragansett Bay.8 At that time the 
native population was estimated to have been approximately 
90,000.9 Subsequent contact was rare until about 1590 when 
Rhode Island started to be regularly visited by traders and 
explorers.10 One result of this contact was the outbreak of 
epidemics of what was probably both hepatitis and smallpox. 
These diseases reduced the populations of the Southern New 
England tribes and made way for European settlement. In 
1636, a group led by Roger Williams established Providence, 
the first permanent European presence in the Rhode Island. By 
1670, the native population in southern New England was 
reduced to between 10,000 and 20,000. 11 A peace marked by 
minor incursions and growing distrust persisted until 1675-6 
when the King Phillip War erupted. The war consisted of a 
number of skirmishes around the state ending in a rout of the 
Indians at the Great Swamp Fight in West Kingston, Rhode 
Island. 12 Warriors continued to fight and there followed a 
yearlong chase that took both the pursued and the pursuers 
west to New York State, back up the Connecticut River Valley, 
then east to what are now the western suburbs of Boston and 
finally back south to Eastern Rhode Island. Here the chase 
ended with the death of Canochet, the powerful chief of the 
Narragansetts. This substantially ended Indian sovereignty and 
resistance in Southern New England. From a pre-war 
population of 5,000, only about 200 Narragansett survived the 
war's end in 1682. Many of those who survived either fled 
their former land or lived among the white population as 
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servants or slaves. 13 
By 1840, the Narragansetts' prospects were sufficiently dire 
that the State of Rhode Island appointed a "commissioner of 
the Indian tribe."14 His duty was to "superintend the affairs of 
the tribe; to bring, in his own name, all actions in behalf of the 
tribe, to settle all controversies among its members related to 
their estate, real and personal, and all other matters, subject to 
an appeal to the General assembly." 15 The moribund condition 
of tribe continued to worsen over time. In his report to the 
General Assembly in January 1858, the commissioner wrote: 
The whole number of all grades residing in 
Charlestown at the present time is one hundred and 
forty-seven. Of this number fifteen are foreigners, 
eleven being connected with the tribe by marriage, and 
four by illicit intercourse. Of the whole number, there is 
not an Indian of full blood remaining; only two of 
three-fourths, and nine of half blood. The one hundred 
and twenty-one less than half blood are of mixed grades 
of Indian, Negro, and White. 16 
In January, 1879, Gideon Ammons, the president of the 
Narragansett Indian Council and other members of the council 
petitioned the Rhode Island House of Representatives to 
appoint a select committee to explore ways to abolish relations 
with the tribe, confer citizenship on its members, and dispose 
of its remaining land. At a meeting on December 26, 1879, the 
Indian Council agreed to Quitclaim all tribal lands to the 
state.17 
In 1880, Rhode Island legislatively terminated their tribal 
status and the Narragansetts sold 3,200 acres of their 
reservation for the sum $5,000. 18 This sale left them with only 
two acres, which was the site of a stone Indian meetinghouse 
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built by Indian masons in 1859.19 This sum seemed generous 
since the state lost money when it subsequently resold that 
land. In 1898, The Rhode Island Supreme Court denied 
attempts by the tribe to rescind the 1880 purchase and sale and 
termination of their tribal status. 20 
The Narragansetts did not regain their land untill975, when 
they filed two lawsuits claiming the land. These suits clouded 
title to literally hundreds of parcels of land and made transfer 
of ownership difficult. United States Senator John H. Chafee 
(Republican, RI) brokered a compromise among the Federal 
government, the State of Rhode Island and Providence 
Plantations, and the Narragansett Indian Tribe. The 
compromise took the form of a Joint Memorandum (hereinafter 
referred to as the J-Mem). The federal enabling statute 
substantially mimicked the language of the J-Mem, and 
included in relevant part "settlement land shall be subject to the 
civil and criminal laws and jurisdiction of the State of Rhode 
Island."21 After agreeing to the terms of the J-Mem, the 
relationship between the Narragansetts and the State of Rhode 
Island grew increasingly contentious for several decades. Two 
tribes in neighboring Connecticut22 established lucrative high 
stakes casinos in 1986 and 1996. The Narragansetts tried 
unsuccessfully to petition the state for a gaming license on 
several occasions claiming that the funds generated from a 
casino would be used for social programs. The tribe next 
devised a plan to sell untaxed cigarettes. It was their contention 
that since the sales took place on settlement lands; the Rhode 
Island tobacco tax scheme did not apply. 
THE SMOKE SHOP RAID LITIGATION 
Following the Rhode Island State Police raid on the 
Narragansett Indian Smoke Shop, the Narragansett's filed suit 
in federal district court seeking a declaratory judgment that its 
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sovereign status as a federally recognized Indian tribe 
precluded the state from applying its cigarette tax scheme to 
the tribe's sale of cigarettes on settlement lands. Relatedly, the 
tribe also sought a declaration that sovereign immunity 
insulated it from the State's criminal process and shielded from 
arrest those tribal members who had participated in the 
operation of the smoke shop.23 The parties agreed to dismiss 
the criminal charges against the eight defendants without 
prejudice pending the outcome of this litigation. 
Both parties cross-moved for summary judgment. The 
district court ruled in the State's favor on both issues. The court 
based its decision on two separate grounds. First, the incidence 
of such a tax falls upon the purchaser. Therefore, the Indians 
were not being taxed but were simply agents collecting the tax 
from the purchaser for the State. 24 The other finding was that, 
"The state did not violate federal law or the Tribe's sovereign 
rights when it enforced its criminal statutes by executing a 
search warrant, and making arrests pursuant to that warrant, on 
tribal land. "25 
The Tribe appealed this decision and a panel of the First 
Circuit reversed the lower court's ruling. The court began by 
upholding the applicability of the State's statute which taxed 
sales of cigarettes within the geographic boundaries of Rhode 
Island whether those sales were made by tribal members, or 
were on tribal lands, as long as the purchasers were non-tribal 
customers. The court went on to rule that while the tribe had no 
sovereign right to sell untaxed cigarettes, the state had no right 
to violate the tribe's sovereign immunity by dispatching the 
state police to execute warrants on tribal land. 26 
The State of Rhode Island appealed the decision and a 
hearing en bane was convened for purposes of determining 
whether the state could enforce its civil and criminal laws with 
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respect to the operation of the smoke shop and the effect (if 
any) of tribal sovereign immunity on the State's enforcement 
authority. As to whether the State may enforce its laws through 
the execution of a search warrant on settlement lands, the court 
stated: 
As the unqualified language of both the J-Mem and the 
Settlement Act makes pellucid, the authority ceded to 
the State and assented to by the Tribe was broad in its 
terms. The negotiated arrangement and the confirmatory 
statute effectively extinguished the Tribe's right to resist 
the application of state authority as to matters occurring 
on the settlement lands. And that arrangement drew no 
distinction between tribal members and the Tribe itself, 
on the one hand, and the general public, on the other 
hand.27 
The court then turned to the question of whether tribal 
sovereign immunity prohibits the State from serving a warrant 
against the Narragansett Tribe or its members. The court dealt 
with dissenting justices from the earlier decision. 
They suggest that our approach to this question 
disregards the subtle but important distinction between 
tribal sovereignty and tribal sovereign immunity ... This 
criticism rests on shaky ground. It framed the 
distinction, as being that the doctrine of tribal 
sovereignty contemplates that, in certain circumstances, 
a tribe is not subject to state laws at all, whereas tribal 
sovereign immunity means that a tribe is not amenable 
to state judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings to enforce 
those laws.28 
In the court's view, this approach is a misreading of U.S. 
Supreme Court precedent and overruled the cited case with 
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respect to the distinction in question. 
The Narragansett Tribe argued that its sovereign status as a 
federally recognized tribe rendered it immune from the 
exercise of State power, including, but not limited to, the 
search warrants. It argued that even if the State of Rhode Island 
executed a warrant against an individual on settlement lands, it 
lacked the authority to execute the warrant against the tribe or 
its property. The court dealt with this assertion by stating that, 
"the State's most potent retort is that the combined force of the 
J-Mem (by waiver) and section 1708 (a) (by abrogation) 
defeats the Tribe's claim of sovereign immunity."29 
The tribe appealed the ruling of the First Circuit decision. 
On November 27, 2006, the U.S. Supreme Court denied 
certiorari30 and the state reinstated criminal charges against 
eight Indian defendants. 31 
CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS ON STATES' TAXING 
POWER 
The dispositive factor in whether or not a state tax on 
Indians and Indian activity is valid is where and on whom the 
burden of the tax falls . States lack the authority to tax when the 
burden of the tax falls on Indians or on Indian property. States 
have been permitted to impose property tax on the property of 
non-Indians even though that property is located on reservation 
land. In Utah and Northern Railroad Company v. Fisher,32 a 
railroad line that was not owned by the tribe ran across the Fort 
Hill Indian Reservation. Idaho assessed a property tax against 
the owners. The Court held that since the Indians had no 
ownership interest in the property the state was permitted to 
impose the tax. Thomas v. Gay33 extended the rule to personal 
property. In this case the taxpayer had paid the Indians a fee to 
permit his herd of cattle to graze on reservation land. While the 
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Court recognized that permitting Oklahoma to impose a tax on 
the herd might lessen the value of the grazing rights, it held 
that the tax was too remote and indirect to be a tax on lands or 
privileges of the Indians. 34 Where these cases involved taxing 
of non-Indians, the ban on taxing Indians for on-reservation 
activity is almost total. McClanahan v. State Tax 
Commissioner of Arizona,35 decided the applicability of 
Arizona's state income tax to income earned by a Navajo 
Indian completely from on reservation activities. The Court 
held that "since appellant is an Indian and since her income 
derived wholly from reservation sources, her activity is totally 
within the sphere which the treaty and statute leave for the 
Federal Government and the Indians themselves."36 State taxes 
on non-Indians working on reservations have also been held to 
be invalid if federal law preempts the subject. In Warren 
Trading Post v. Tax Comm 'n, 37 The Court held that Arizona 
could not tax the gross receipts of the owner of a trading post, 
when trading with Indians on reservation land generated those 
receipts. The Ninth Circuit held the states may not tax fuel used 
by non-Indian contractors in cutting and transporting timber on 
reservation land when the harvest was subject to extensive 
federal regulation. 38 
The U.S. Supreme Court seems to be somewhat more 
differential to state efforts to tax Indian cigarette sales. On four 
occasions, it has addressed issues of Indians on reservation 
land selling untaxed cigarette to non-Indians, and in each case 
the court has upheld the state's taxing scheme. However where 
and what methods the state may use to collect those taxes is 
still somewhat murky. In 1976, the Court decided Moe v. 
Salish & Kootenai Tribes,39 a case that examined the validity 
of Montana's cigarette tax scheme. Montana argued that its tax 
scheme applied to all sales of cigarettes to non-Indians within 
the state regardless of the status or location of the seller. The 
Montana statute, like Rhode Island's statute, presumed that the 
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tax was a "direct [tax] on the retail consumer precollected for 
the purpose of convenience and facility only.'140 The tribe 
presented two arguments that the tax as applied to it was 
invalid. However, the Court found neither convincing. The first 
argument was that if the Indian seller were forced to sell taxed 
cigarettes, he would suffer a "measurable out-of-pocket loss.'141 
These expenses were the additional cost of purchasing taxed 
cigarettes over the cost of untaxed cigarettes. The court 
discounted this argument since it ignored the fact that the 
expense would be recouped upon resale to the end consumer. If 
Indians were permitted to sell untaxed cigarettes to non-
Indians, either the smoker reaps the benefit of the untaxed 
cigarette in the form of a lower price or the Indian seller 
realizes the profits. The second argument was that the tax made 
the Indian seller an involuntary agent of the state and this was a 
gross interference with tribe status. The Court found this 
interference a "minimal burden"42 and not grounds to 
invalidate the statute. 
The second case to come before the Court was Washington 
v. The Confederated Tribes of the Colville Reservation. 43 There 
were two factual differences between this case and the Idaho 
case. First, Washington State seized and impounded a shipment 
of untaxed cigarettes from out-of-state wholesalers bound for 
tribal sellers. The Court dealt with this issue by finding that, 
"Although the cigarettes in transit are as yet exempt from state 
taxation, they are not immune from seizure when the Tribes, as 
here, have refused to fulfill collection and remittance 
obligations. "44 The Court continued "It is significant that these 
seizures take place outside the reservation in locations where 
the state power over Indian affairs is considerably more 
expansive than it is within reservation boundaries. '145 The other 
important difference between the cases was that the State of 
Washington also imposed a sales tax on cigarettes and required 
that the tribes keep records of the identity of all purchasers and 
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the quantity of cigarettes purchased in all non-taxable 
transactions. Although the mechanism for collecting the two 
taxes is different [one involves pre-purchase of tax stamps 
while the other requires the seller to collect the tax from the 
buyer at the time of sale] the Court found that sales tax 
involved a "simple collection burden .. .legally indistinguish-
able from the collection burden upheld in Moe. "46 As to the 
records which the tribes were required to keep, the Court held 
that, "The Tribes not the State ... bear the burden of showing 
that the record keepin.p requirements which they are 
challenging are invalid. ,,4 The tribe did not show that the 
requirements were not reasonably necessary to prevent 
fraudulent transactions. 
In California State Board of Equalization v. Chemehuevi 
Indian Tribe, 48 the state's cigarette tax statute did not contain 
"an expressed statement that the tax is to be passed onto the 
ultimate purchaser."49 Again the Court held the tax valid, 
further explaining the criteria for requiring tribes and tribal 
members to collect tobacco tax. If "the statutory scheme 
required consumers to pay the tax whenever the vendor was 
untaxable, and thus the legal incidence of the tax fell on the 
purchaser,"50 then the state may impose the burden of 
collecting the tax on the tribe. 
Department of Finance and Taxation of New York v. 
Milhelm Attea & Bros. 51 arose out of a New York State audit, 
which revealed that if all the untaxed cigarettes sold on New 
York's reservations were consumed by tax-immune Indians, 
then tribal members were smoking at a rate 32 times greater 
than the general population. Alternatively if these cigarettes 
were being sold to non-Indians, New York was being deprived 
of about $65 million in tax revenue. 52 In response New York 
passed a law restricting the number of untaxed cigarettes that 
distributors could sell to tribes and tribal retailers. The number 
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was to be set either by agreement between the Department of 
Finance and Taxation and each tribe or in the absence of an 
agreement, by the Department based on a probable demand. 
Further, distributors were required to submit monthly reports to 
the state detailing the identity of all persons making tax-exempt 
.. distributors filed suit 
InJUnctive rehef cla1mmg the Indian Trading Statutes5 
preempted the New York law. 54 The Court once again found 
the state regulations valid and held that even in an area where 
the federal government imposed licensing regulatory 
requirements, the states could still impose reasonable 
regulatory burdens on Indian Traders when required by 
balancing federal state and tribal interests. 55 
IMPACT OF THE FIRST CIRCUIT'S DECISION ON THE 
TREATY TRIBES 
The first circuit's holding that Rhode Island officials acted 
within their authority to enforce the cigarette tax scheme by 
executing a search warrants against the tribe and arresting 
tribal members while searching for and seizing contraband 
from its smoke shop expands on previous law.56 The court 
reasoned that the explicit language of the Settlement Act and 
the J-Mem, when considered in its historical context, allowed 
the state to enforce its civil and criminal laws on tribal lands 
and that the tribe is not immune from the state's enforcement 
activities. 57 The question remains of what impact, if any, the 
court's ruling will have on other tribes who became sovereign 
entities through similar settlement acts as the one considered 
here. Rhode Island, the Town of Charlestown, and the 
landowners whose title had been clouded by the tribe's claim 
came together with the tribe to execute an agreement that 
resolved the land disputes between the parties. 58 At all times, 
the negotiations and agreements were based on the mutual 
consent of all parties.59 The fruits of their labor, the J-Mem, 
2009/Narragansett's Smoke Shop Raid/112 
provided that the 1 ,800 acres of settlement lands were to be 
formed out of two parcels, one of which was donated by the 
state and the other to be purchased from private landowners 
with federal funds. 60 The tribe gained control of these lands in 
exchange for its relinquishment of its claims, the voluntary 
dismissal of its lawsuits, and the agreement that the state would 
retain civil and criminal jurisdiction over the settlement 
lands.61 Therefore, in balancing state, federal, and tribal 
interests, the Settlement Act thus increases the room available 
fi . . 62 or state mtervent10n. 
Perhaps move important is the first circuit's holding that 
general Indian law also supports this conclusion. A state may 
assert power that has not been preempted by federal law.63 In 
applying the federal preemption doctrine, the court must 
consider the nature of the state, federal, and tribal interests at 
stake.64 It must pay attention to the goals of promoting Indian 
self-government and self-sufficiency.65 In this case, the court 
held that Rhode Island was lawful in asserting state power. 
There was no special federal legislation that gave the tribe any 
special powers to sell cigarettes. 66 Although the tribe has an 
interest in raising revenue for the benefit of its members, the 
goods it wished to sell were neither made by, nor had any 
special meaning to, the Tribe and any commercial connection 
was fleeting at best since the goods were largely being sold to 
non-members.67 In balancing state, federal, and tribal interests, 
the Settlement Act thus increases the room available for state 
intervention.68 The tribe's interest in selling cigarettes to 
nonmembers who do not benefit from tribal services is 
unpersuasive, as the state has a strong interest in preserving its 
tax scheme against cigarette purchasers who wish to avoid it.69 
A tribe's sovereign immunity can be either waived by 
tribal consent or abrogated by congressional authority.70 Such 
actions must be clear and unequivocal in their meaning, but no 
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specific terms are required to effect such a waiver or 
abrogation. 71 In this case, the Tribe voluntarily waived its tribal 
sovereign immunity when it signed onto the J-Mem. This 
waiver, as the court so aptly stated, was an "integral part of the 
bare-knuckled negotiations" that gave rise to the settlement 
lands.72 Rhode Island was thus within its authority to use all its 
powers to enforce its civil and criminal laws on tribal lands and 
the Tribe is not immune from such enforcement. 
CONCLUSION 
The thrust of the first circuit court's opinion in this case is 
that a unique historical context surrounded the negotiations that 
gave rise to the J-Mem and the resulting Settlement Act.73 The 
court calls the Settlement Act a "carefully calibrated agreement 
between sovereigns" and maintains that it is a result of 
"idiosyncratic circumstances."74 Thus it would seem that the 
holding of the court in this case is a narrow one, applying only 
to the specific circumstances of this case and the unique 
relationship, based on federal statute, between Rhode Island 
and the Tribe. 
However, the court's observation that general Indian law 
supports its conclusions regarding a state's enforcement 
activities opens the possibility that other tribes and states 
whose concurrent jurisdiction is codified in federal legislation 
may be affected by the same rule of law that is articulated in 
this case.75 In the general body of Indian law, while a court 
decision usually involves only one tribe, the rules of law are 
applied more generally.76 
While the Rhode Island Settlement Act may have unique 
historical antecedents, it is not unique in its structure or its 
origin. Several formerly all-but-extinct tribes have similar 
settlement agreements that re-established them as sovereign 
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entities. 77 In the 1970s, a number of tribes began asserting 
claims over ancestral lands, alleging that state
78
authorities 
violated the Trade and Intercourse Act of 1790 by purchasmg 
land from the tribes without approval from the federal 
government. In order to avoid costly pending litigation, 
states where these fonner tribes were located entered mto 
settlement agreements. 
For these so-called "Treaty Tribes" (the tribes that have 
entered into settlement agreements with government), the 
Narragansett case should have special If such 
settlements were reached voluntarily and with assistance of 
counsel, they might well prove dispositive of the rights, 
as they proved to be in the Narragansett case. While Impor:ant 
to the parties, this case has implications for many other 
and states. The settlements that the tribe entered mto 
voluntarily and with the assistance of legal counsel are now the 
basis upon which their legal status rests. 
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